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Abstract
We address the following dynamic version of the school choice question: a city, named
City, admits students in two temporally-separated rounds, denoted R1 and R2. In round
R1, the capacity of each school is fixed but in round R2, the City is happy to allocate extra
seats to specific schools per the recommendation of the mechanism; in turn, the latter has to
meet specified requirements. We study three natural settings of this model, with the require-
ments getting increasingly more stringent. For Settings I and II, we give pairs of polynomial
time mechanisms (M1,M2) which, besides addressing the specific requirements, find stable
matchings, are dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) w.r.t. reporting preference lists
of students, and never break, in round R2, a match created in round R1.
In Setting III, the mechanism needs to deal with residents of the City who try to game the
system by not participating in round R1 and only showing up in round R2, in addition to
gaming by misreporting preference lists. For this setting, we need to introduce the notion of a
non-oblivious mechanism: such a mechanism needs to know the preference lists of all students
who reside in the City, including the ones who don’t participate in round R1. Further, we
need to weaken DSIC to mechanisms in which truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium; we call
these ICNE mechanisms.
After establishing, via two impossibility results, that the strongest result we can hope to
obtain for Setting III is a pair of non-oblivious, stability-preserving, ICNE mechanisms, we
present such a pair. Both mechanisms of the pair run in polynomial time.
1 Introduction
School choice is among the most consequential events in a child’s upbringing, whether it is
admission to elementary, middle or high school, and hence has been accorded its due importance
not only in the education literature but also in game theory and economics. In order to deal with
the flaws in the practices of the day, the seminal paper of Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [AS03]
formulated this as a mechanism design problem. This approach has been enormously successful,
especially in large cities involving the admission of tens of thousands of students into hundreds
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of schools, e.g., see [APR09, ACP+17, AS13, Pat11], and today occupies a key place in the area of
market design in economics, e.g., see [RS12, Rot08, Rot16, ftToC19].
Once the basic game-theoretic issues in school choice were adequately addressed, researchers
turned attention to the next level of questions. In this vein, in a very recent paper, Feigenbaum et.
al. [FKLS18] remarked, “However, most models considered in this literature are essentially static.
Incorporating dynamic considerations in designing assignment mechanisms ... is an important
aspect that has only recently started to be addressed.”
Our paper deals with precisely this. We study three natural settings in which students need to
be assigned to schools in two temporally-separated rounds, denoted R1 and R2, for which we
give mechanisms M1 and M2, respectively. M1 finds a stable matching M in round R1. In
round R2, additional students need to be assigned to the schools. We want that M2 should also
yield a stable matching, besides having other nice properties. Clearly, the task of M2 would be
a lot simpler if it were allowed to reassign the schools of a small number of students who were
matched in round R1. However, one of our central tenets is to disallow this altogether. Indeed,
switching the school of a student midway, unsynchronized with her classmates, is well-known
to cause traumatic effects, e.g., see [GDE12]. Hence,M2 must extend M to a stable matching M′.
The use of Gale-Shapley student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which finds a student-
optimal stable matching of students to schools, has emerged as a method of choice in the litera-
ture. Two main advantages of this method are:
1. As a consequence of stability, once the matching is done, no student and school, who are not
matched to each other, will have the incentive to go outside the mechanism to strike a deal.
Another advantage of stability is that it eliminates justified envy, i.e., the following situation
cannot arise: there is a student si who prefers another student sj’s school assignment, say
hk, while being fully aware that hk preferred her to sj.
2. This mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), for students. This entails
that regardless of the preferences reported by other students, a student can do no better
than report her true preference list, i.e., truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all students.
This immediately simplifies the task of students and their parents, since they don’t need to
waste any effort trying to game the system.
In all three settings, we give a pair of mechanisms (M1,M2) which run in polynomial time and
M2 extends, in a stable manner, the stable matching found byM1. Additionally, for the first two
settings, (M1,M2) are DSIC for students w.r.t. reporting their preference lists. The additional
requirements for Setting III are much more stringent and we show that DSIC mechanisms don’t
exist for it; see the requirements below. Instead, we switch to the weaker notion of a mecha-
nism for which incentive compatibility is a Nash equilibrium (ICNE), e.g., see [?, ?]. Under such a
mechanism, a student cannot gain by misreporting her choices, if all other students are truthful.
The three settings involve the admission of students of a city, named City, into schools; the
preference lists of both students and schools are provided to the mechanisms. In round R1,
the capacity of each school is fixed but in round R2, the City is happy to allocate extra seats to
specific schools per the recommendation of mechanismM2, which in turn has to meet specified
requirements imposed by the City. In this round, in Settings I and II,M1 finds a student-optimal
stable matching M. Let L be the set of left-over students, those who could not be admitted in this
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round.
In round R2 of Setting I, the problem is to maximize the number of students admitted from L,
by extending M in a stability-preserving, DSIC manner. In Setting II, a set N of new students also
arrive from other cities and their preference lists are revealed to M2. The requirement now is to
admit as few students as possible from N and subject to that, as many as possible from L, again
in a stability-preserving, DSIC manner. Next, we consider a slightly different problem within
Setting II, namely find the largest subset of (N ∪ L) that can be matched in a stability-preserving
and DSIC manner. We give an efficient mechanism for this as well.
In Setting III, some students, who are residents of the City, try to game the system by not partic-
ipating in round R1 but only showing up in round R2, thereby attempting to get admission to
a better school. Therefore, M2 needs to be incentive compatible not only w.r.t. preference lists
but also late participation. We note that the previous mechanisms were all oblivious in that they
were given the preference lists of only those students who were being considered for admission,
and not those who were not participating. For Setting III, we need to define the notion of a
non-oblivious mechanism, which needs to know the preference lists of all students who reside in
the City, including the ones who don’t participate in round R1.
We prove two impossibility results which clarify the strongest properties we can hope to expect
from a pair (M1,M2) of mechanisms for Setting III. First, we prove that there is no pair of
non-oblivious, stability-preserving, DSIC mechanisms. Second, we prove that there is no pair
of oblivious, stability-preserving, ICNE mechanisms. That leaves the possibility of obtaining a
pair of non-oblivious, stability-preserving, ICNE mechanisms for Setting III, and this is what we
obtain. Additionally, both our mechanisms run in polynomial time.
We finally give a procedure that outputs all possible stability-preserving extensions of a given
stable matching (which may be exponentially many) with polynomial delay.
1.1 Related work
Besides the references pointed out above on school choice, in this section, we will concentrate on
recent work on dynamic matching markets, especially those pertaining to school choice. Feigen-
baum et. al. [FKLS18] study the following issue that arises in NYC public high schools, which
admits over 80,000 students annually: after the initial centralized allocation, about 10% of the
students choose not attend the school allocated to them, instead going to private or charter
schools. To deal with this, [FKLS18] give a two-round solution which maintains truthfulness and
efficiency and minimizes the movement of students between schools.
An interesting phenomena that has been observed in matching markets is unraveling, under
which matches are made early to beat the competition, even though it leads to inefficiencies due
to unavailability of full information. A classic case, indeed one that motivated the formation of
centralized clearing houses, is that of the market for medical interns in which contracts for interns
were signed two years before the future interns would even graduate [Rot84]. A theoretical
explanation of this phenomena was recently provided by [EP16].
We note that the phenomena we are studying in Setting III can be viewed as anti-unraveling:
some students are able to game the system by making the match late. Clearly, this aspect deserves
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more work. We also note that this phenomenon is by no means rare, e.g., it occurred in the
Pasadena School District and the authorities were made specific recommendations by economists
from Caltech to counter it [Ech19].
[KK18] point out that stable pairings may not necessarily last forever, e.g., a student may switch
from private to public school or a married couple may divorce. They study dynamic, multi-
period, bilateral matching markets and they define and identify sufficient conditions for the
existence of a dynamically stable matching.
[Dov18] develops a notion of stability that applies in markets where matching opportunities ar-
rive over time, much like the seats in our work. One of the things shown in this paper is that
agents’ incentive to wait for better matching opportunities can make achieving stability very dif-
ficult. Indeed, the notion of dynamic stability given in this paper is a necessary condition which
a matching must satisfy in order that agents do not to find it profitable to game a mechanism by
showing up in later rounds.
A number of recent papers [Wes13, DY18, ADE+18, DK14, HI17] consider the consequences
of having a mechanism that repeats the Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance algorithm multiple
times, similar to our work. Note that Deferred Acceptance is not consistent in that if one runs
it, then removes some agents and their assignments, and runs it again on the remaining agents,
one does not obtain the same assignment restricted to the left-over agents. In these papers, the
authors show that there is room for manipulation by submitting empty lists in the first round.
However, unlike our model in which changes are introduced in round R2, in all these papers,
there is nothing that motivates running Deferred Acceptance tICNEe, namely no arrivals of new
students, no change in capacities, no changes in preferences, etc.
1.2 Overview of structural and algorithmic ideas
The main idea for obtaining a stability-preserving mechanism in round R2 for Settings I and II
lies in the notion of a barrier which ensures that students admitted in R2 do not form blocking
pairs. A crucial issue is to place barriers optimally to ensure that the number of students admit-
ted is optimized (minimized or maximized) appropriately. The main idea in these settings for
achieving DSIC mechanisms is to ensure that the best school that a student can be matched to is
independent of her preference list. If so, her best outcome results from truthfully revealing her
preference list.
Perhaps our most interesting result is the pair of mechanisms for Setting III. As already pointed
out, no oblivious mechanism exists for this problem. The idea behind our non-oblivious mecha-
nismM1 is to prepare the round R1 matching M in such a way that the defectors, i.e., residents
of the City who opt not to participate in round R1, will not be able to get admission to a better
school by arriving only in round R2. For this,M1 needs to know the preference lists of not only
students participating in round R1, but also the defectors, hence making it non-oblivious.
The algorithm for enumerating stable extensions of a stable matching, given in Section 6, relies
heavily on the fundamental structural property of stable matchings given in Lemma 2. Enumer-
ated matchings are extended by only one student in an iteration. At each step, the algorithm
finds all such feasible extensions by one student in a way such that there must be at least one
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feasible assignment, for any student, at each step. This assurance is crucial in guaranteeing that
the delay between any two enumerated matchings is polynomial.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The stable matching problem for school choice
The stable matching problem takes as input a set H = {h1, h2, . . . , hm} of m public schools and
a set S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} of n students who are seeking admission to the schools. Each school
hj ∈ H has an integer-valued capacity, c(j), stating the maximum number of students that can
be assigned to it. If hj is assigned c(j) students, we will say that hj is filled, and otherwise it is
under-filled.
Each student si ∈ S has a strict and complete preference list, l(si), over H ∪ {∅}. If si prefers ∅
to hj, then she prefers remaining unassigned rather being assigned to school hj. We will assume
that the list l(si) is ordered by decreasing preferences. Therefore, if si prefers hj to hk, we can
equivalently say that hj appears before hk or hk appears after hj on si’s preference list. Clearly, the
order among the schools occurring after ∅ on si’s list is immaterial, since si prefers remaining
unassigned rather than being assigned to any one of them. Similarly, each school hj ∈ H has a
strict and complete preference list, l(hj), over S ∪ {∅}. Once again, for each student si occurring
after ∅, hj prefers remaining under-filled rather than admitting si, and the order among these
students is of no consequence.
Given a set of schools, H′ ⊆ H, by the best school for si in H
′ we mean the school that si prefers
the most among the schools in H′. Similarly, given a set of students, S′ ⊆ S, by the best student
for hj in S
′ we mean the student whom hj prefers the most among the students in S
′.
A matching M is function, M : S → H ∪ {∅} such that if M(si) = hj then it must be the case
that si prefers hj to ∅ and hj prefers si to ∅; if so, we say that student si is assigned to school hj.
If M(si) = ∅, then si is not assigned to any school. The matching M also has to ensure that the
number of students assigned to each school hj is at most c(j).
For a matching M, a student-school pair (si, hj) is said to be a blocking pair if si is not assigned to
hj, si prefers hj to M(si) and one of the following conditions holds:
1. hj prefers si to one of the students assigned to hj, or
2. hj is under-filled and hj prefers si to ∅.
The blocking pair is said to be type 1 (type 2) if the first (second) condition holds. A matching M
is said to be stable if there is no blocking pair for it.
Most of the mechanisms presented in this paper are dominant-strategy incentive-compatibile, for the
students, i.e., truth-telling is a weakly-dominant strategy for students: they cannot gain by being
untruthful, regardless of what the others do. We will often shorten this term to DSIC mechanism.
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3 Problem Definition and the Three Settings
As stated above, in this paper, we will study assignment of students to schools in two rounds,R1
and R2, which are temporally separated. In this section we state the three settings studied; for
each, we will have two mechanisms, M1 and M2. In round R1, mechanism M1 finds a stable
matching of students to schools, M. In round R2, M2 extends M to M′, which is also required
to be stable. By extends we mean that M2 is not allowed to break a match created by M1; it can
only match additional student-school pairs.
The students report their preference lists and the mechanisms operate on whatever is reported.
We will assume that the schools’ preference lists are truthfully reported and we will show that
in each of the three settings, (M1,M2) are DSIC for students, hence showing that the students
gain nothing by misreporting their preference lists.
We now state the common aspects of the first two settings before describing them completely;
the third setting is quite different. In both, in round R1, the setup defined in Section 2.1 prevails
and M1 simply computes the student-optimal stable matching respecting the capacity of each
school, namely c(j) for hj. Let this matching be denoted by M, SM ⊆ S be the set of students
assigned to schools by M and L = (S− SM) be the set of left-over students. As shown in [DF81],
M1 is DSIC for students.
In round R2, the City has decided to extend matching M in a stable, DSIC manner without any
restrictions on extra capacity added to each school. Let us denote this matching by M′ and let
c′(j) be the number of students matched to school hj, equivalently the round R2 capacity of school
hj, for hj ∈ H. Once we obtain the solution under this assumption, we will show how it can be
modified in case the City can only add a restricted number of extra seats to each school.
Lemma 1. For some student si, let M(si) = hj. Then for any student sk ∈ L, sk appears after si in l(hj).
Proof. If sk were to appear before si in l(hj), then (sk, hj) will form a blocking pair for M, contra-
dicting its stability.
3.1 Setting I
In this setting, in round R2, the City wants to admit as many students from L as possible in a
stablity-preserving, DSIC manner. We will call this problem MaxL. We will prove the following:
Theorem 1. There is a polynomial time mechanism M2 that is DSIC for students and extends matching
M to M′ so that M′ is stable w.r.t. students S and schools H. Furthermore,M2 yields the largest matching
that can be obtained by a mechanism satisfying the stated conditions.
Let k be the maximum number of students that can be added from L, as per Theorem 1. Next,
suppose that the City can only afford to add k′ < k extra seats. We show in Section 5.1 how this
can be achieved while maintaining all the properties stated in Theorem 1.
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3.2 Setting II
In this setting, in round R2, in addition to the leftover set L, a set N of new students arrive from
other cities and their preference lists are revealed to mechanism M2. Additionally, the schools
also update their preference lists to include the new students. In this setting, the City wants to
give preference to students who were not matched in round R1, i.e., L, over the new students, N.
Thus it seeks the subset of N that must be admitted to avoid blocking pairs and subject to that,
maximize the subset of L that can be added, again in a stability-preserving manner. We will call
this problem MinNMaxL. We will prove the following:
Theorem 2. There is a polynomial time mechanism M2 that is DSIC for students and accomplishes the
following:
1. It finds smallest subset N′ ⊆ N with which the current matching M needs to be extended in a
stability-preserving manner.
2. Subject to the previous extension, it finds the largest subset L′ ⊆ L with which the matching can be
extended further in a stability-preserving manner.
3.3 Setting III
In this setting, students residing in the City game the system by not participating in round R1
and only participating in round R2. This is illustrated in Example 1. For ease of comprehension,
in this example we have used the following small variant of Setting II: a student can either be in
set S and participate in round R1 (and in round R2, if she is put in L) or in set N and participate
in round R2 only.
Example 1. Assume there are 3 students A, B,C and two schools 1, 2. The preference lists of the
students are l(A) = (2, 1), l(B) = (1, 2), l(C) = (1, 2). The preference lists of the schools are
l(1) = (C, A, B), l(2) = (B, A,C). In round R1, each school has a capacity of 1 seat. A and C are
both in set S in round R1. If B is also in set S in round R1, she will be matched to school 2. On the other
hand, if she is in set N in round R2, she will be matched to school 1, which she prefers.
Next, we formally define (the rather complex) Setting III. In round R1, mechanism M1 is given
the preference lists of all students, S, who reside in the City, and the capacities and preference
lists of the set H of public schools in the City. A subset S2 ⊆ S of students cheat and decide not
to participate in round R1, hoping to be assigned to a better school by participating in round R2
only. The remaining set S1 = (S − S2) participate in round R1. Mechanism M1 finds a stable
matching, M, of a subset SM ⊆ S1 with schools in H. Let L = (S1− SM) denote the set of left-over
students. Example 1 below illustrates how a student in S2 can get into a better school by cheating.
In addition to S2, a set N of new students arrive from other cities in round R2. As in Setting II,
mechanism M2 is given their preference lists as well as the preference lists of schools, updated
with these students. Hence, the set of students who are seeking admission to public schools
in round R2 is (S2 ∪ N ∪ L). Mechanism M2 is required to extend M to a stable matching M′
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by matching as few students as possible from S2 ∪ N and, subject to that, as many students as
possible from L.
3.3.1 A strengthening and a weakening
The insight we obtained from Example 1 was that to prevent this new kind of cheating we
will need to enhance the capability of the mechanisms. We note that the mechanisms given for
Settings I and II were oblivious in that they were given the preference lists of only the students
who were participating in that particular round, and not the rest. For Setting III, we introduce
the new notion of a non-oblivious mechanism, which knows the preference lists of all students
who reside in the City, including the ones who don’t participate in round R1. Clearly, this is a
strengthening of the notion of an oblivious mechanism.
However, as established in our first impossibility result, Theorem 4, there is no pair of non-
oblivious, stability-preserving, DSIC mechanisms. For this reason, we weaken DSIC to a mech-
anism for which incentive-compatibility is a Nash equilibrium (ICNE). This notion has been studied
extensively, and is sometimes called a Nash implementation, e.g., see [?, ?]. Thus M is an ICNE
mechanism if for each agent, truth-telling is a dominant strategy if all the rest of the agents are
telling the truth. This notion is weaker than DSIC in that if some agent s1 is lying, then another
agent, say s2, can gain by lying.
At this point, a natural question arises: Can we obtain a pair of oblivious, stability-preserving,
ICNE mechanisms for Setting III? Our second impossibility result, Theorem 6, shows that the
answer is “No”. Hence, Theorem 3 gives the strongest result one can hope to get for Setting III.
Theorem 3. There is a pair of polynomial time, non-oblivious mechanisms (M1,M2) such that:
1. M1 computes a stable matching, M, in roundR1 andM2 extends it to M
′ in a stability-preserving
manner.
2. The combined mechanism is ICNE for students w.r.t. revealing true preference lists as well as not
gaming their participation round.
3. Subject to the above requirements, M2 maximizes students admitted from L among all mechanisms
that minimize students admitted from (S2 ∪ N).
4 Impossibility Results
In this section, we will prove the two impossibility results we described in Section 3.3. For this
purpose, we will first need to enhance Example 1 to the much more sophisticated and carefully
designed Example 2.
Example 2. Assume there are 4 students A, B,C,D and 3 schools 1,2,3. The preferences for A, B,C,D are
(1, 2, 3), (2, 1, 3), (2, 3, 1), (2, 3, 1), respectively. The preferences for 1, 2, 3 are (B, A,C,D), (A,C, B,D),
(C, B, A,D), respectively. In R1, each school has 1 seat. The only stable matching when all students come
in round R1 is (1B, 2A, 3C).
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Theorem 4. There is no pair of non-oblivious, stability-preserving, DSIC mechanisms (M1,M2) for
Setting III.
Proof. Assume that (M1,M2) is a pair of non-oblivious, stability-preserving, DSIC mechanisms
for Setting III. We will run them on three instances derived from Example 2. In all three instances,
the set of students and schools, S and H, are the same as in Example 2; what differs is the partition
of S into S1, S2.
• I1: S1 = {A, B,C,D} and S2 = ∅.
• I2: S1 = {A, B,D} and S2 = {C}.
• I3: S1 = {A,D} and S2 = {B,C}.
As stated in Example 2, in I1, M1 is forced to pick the unique stable matching (1B, 2A, 3C), in
which C is matched to school 3. In I2, mechanism M1 can choose one of two possible stable
matchings, (1B, 2A, 3D) or (1A, 2B, 3D). Let us consider both possibilities.
1. (1A, 2B, 3D) is chosen. When C participates in roundR2, she has to be assigned to school 2
byM2 in order to preserve stability. Since she prefers school 2 to school 3, she has incentive
to cheat.
2. (1B, 2A, 3D) is chosen. In this matching, B is matched to school 1. Now, we consider
instance I3 in which M1 is forced to pick the unique stable matching (1A, 2D). When B
and C participate in round R2, mechanism M2 will have to match B to school 2 so that
stability is preserved. Since B prefers school 2 to school 1, she has incentive to cheat.
Therefore, for each of the choices, the pair of mechanisms (M1,M2) fails to be DSIC on at least
one of the instances. The contradiction completes the proof.
Remark 5. Observe that in the proof given above, B was able to cheat when another student,
namely C, was also cheating. In contrast, Theorem 3 gives a pair of mechanisms under which B
would not be able to cheat if no other student were cheating.
Theorem 6. There is no pair of oblivious, stability-preserving, ICNE mechanisms (M1,M2) that ensure
that residents of the City can’t gain by opting to participate in round R2 and not in round R1.
Proof. Assume that (M1,M2) is a pair of oblivious, stability-preserving, ICNE mechanisms for
Setting III. We will run them on four instances derived from Example 2. In the first two instances,
the set of students and schools, S and H, are the same as in Example 2, and in the last two,
S = {A, B,D} and H is the same as in Example 2. The partition of S into S1, S2 is as follows:
• I1: S1 = {A, B,C,D} and S2 = ∅.
• I2: S1 = {A, B,D} and S2 = {C}.
• I3: S1 = {A, B,D} and S2 = ∅.
• I4: S1 = {A,D} and S2 = {B}.
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Since the mechanisms are oblivious, in each run, they “know” the preference lists of students
participating in that round only.
As stated in Example 2, in I1, M1 is forced to pick the unique stable matching (1B, 2A, 3C), in
which C is matched to school 3. In I2, mechanism M1 can choose one of two possible stable
matchings, (1B, 2A, 3D) or (1A, 2B, 3D). Let us consider both possibilities.
1. (1A, 2B, 3D) is chosen. When C participates in roundR2, she has to be assigned to school 2
byM2 in order to preserve stability. Since she prefers school 2 to school 3, she has incentive
to cheat even when the rest are telling the truth.
2. (1B, 2A, 3D) is chosen. We now consider instance I3. Since M1 is oblivious, it cannot
distinguish between I2 and I3, and it therefore chooses the stable matching (1A, 2B, 3D) for
I3 as well. Note that B is assigned to school 2 in this matching.
Finally, we consider instance I4 in which M1 picks the unique stable matching (1A, 2D).
When B participates in round R2, mechanism M2 will have to match her to school 2 so
that stability is preserved. Since B prefers school 2 to school 1, she has incentive to cheat
even when the rest are telling the truth.
Therefore, for each of the choices, the pair of mechanisms (M1,M2) fails to be ICNE on at least
one of the instances. The contradiction completes the proof.
From a mathematical viewpoint, perhaps the most interesting aspect of this pair of proofs is the
subtle, though key, contrast that arises because of the difference in the information revealed to
the mechanisms.
5 The Mechanisms
5.1 Setting I
We will first characterize situations under which a matching is not stable, i.e., admits a blocking
pair. This characterization will be used for proving stability of matchings constructed in round
R2. For this purpose, assume that M is an arbitrary matching, not necessarily stable nor related
to the matching computed in round R1. For each school hj ∈ H, define the least preferred student
assigned to hj, denoted LPS-Assigned(hj), to be the student whom hj prefers the least among the
students that are assigned to hj.
Next, for each student si ∈ SM, define the set of schools preferred by si, denoted Preferred-Schools(si)
by {hj | si prefers hj to M(si)}; note that M(si) = ∅ is allowed in this definition. Further, for each
school hj ∈ H, define the set of students that prefer hj over the school they are assigned to, denoted
Preferring-Students(hj) to be {si | hj ∈ Preferred-Schools(si)}. Finally, define the best student
preferring hj, denoted BS-Preferring(hj), to be the student whom hj prefers the best in the set
Preferring-Students(hj). If Preferring-Students(hj) = ∅ then we will define BS-Preferring(hj) =
∅; in particular, this happens if hj is under-filled.
Lemma 2. . W.r.t. matching M, there exists a blocking pair:
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MaxL(M, L):
Input: Stable matching M and set L.
Output: Stable, IC, MaxL extension of M.
1. ∀si ∈ SM : M
′(si)← M(si)
2. ∀hj ∈ H : Barrier(hj)← BS-Preferring(hj).
3. L′ ← {si ∈ L | ∃hj s.t. si appears before Barrier(hj) in l(hj),
and hj appears before ∅ in l(si)}.
4. ∀si ∈ L
′ : Feasible-Schools(si)← {hj | si appears before Barrier(hj) in l(hj)}.
5. ∀si ∈ L
′ : M′(si)← Best school for si in Feasible-Schools(si).
6. ∀si ∈ (L− L
′) : M′(si) ← ∅.
7. Return M′.
Figure 1: Mechanism for round R2 for problem MaxL in Setting I
1. of type 1 iff there is a school hj s.t. hj prefers BS-Preferring(hj) to LPS-Assigned(hj).
2. of type 2 iff there is a school hj that is under-filled and a student si such that si prefers hj to M(si)
and hj prefers si to ∅.
Proof. 1. Suppose for some school hj, BS-Preferring(hj) = si and LPS-Assigned(hj) = sk and
hj prefers si to sk. Then, si prefers hj to M(si) and hj prefers si to sk. Therefore, (si, hj) is
a blocking pair of type 1. Next, assume that (si, hj) is a blocking pair of type 1. Then, it
must be the case that si prefers hj to M(si) and hj prefers si to sk, for some student sk that
is assigned to hj. Clearly, hj weakly prefers sk to LPS-Assigned(hj). Therefore hj prefers
BS-Preferring(hj) to LPS-Assigned(hj).
2. Both directions follow from the definition of blocking pair of type 2.
The mechanism M2 for round R2 for MaxL in Situation I is given in Figure 1. Step 1 simply
ensures that the matching found by M2 extends the round R1 matching. Step 2 defines the
Barrier for each school to be BStP(hj); observe that this could be ∅. Step 3 determines the set
L′ ⊆ L that can to be assigned schools in a stability-preserving manner and Step 5 computes the
school for each student in this subset.
Proof. of Theorem 1: Suppose Barrier(hj) = si (or, ∅). Since all students assigned to hj from L
appear before si (respectively, ∅) in l(hj), therefore by Lemma 2, there is no type 1 (respectively,
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type 2) blocking pair. This establishes the stability of matching M′. Next, consider a student sk ∈
(L− L′) and suppose she is assigned to school hj. By the definition of L
′, hj prefers Barrier(hj) to
sk, therefore, (Barrier(hj), hj) form a blocking pair, which is of type 2 if Barrier(hj) = ∅ and type
1 otherwise. Hence the matching found in round R2 is the largest stable extension of M.
For each student si ∈ L
′, the Barriers are defined independent of her preference list and she is
assigned to the best school hj in which she appears before Barrier(hj). Therefore, the best she can
do is to reveal her true preference list. Hence,M2 is DSIC for students.
For the problem of admitting fewer students, stated in Section 3.1, we give the following:
Proposition 1. Let k be the total number of students added from L in round R2 in the previous theorem
and let k′ < k. There is a polynomial time mechanism M2 that is stability-preserving, DSIC for students
and extends matching M to M′ so that |M′| − |M| = k′.
Proof. Let c′ denote the capacities of schools after round R2 as per Theorem 1. Note that the total
difference in capacities c′ − c over all schools is k, where c is the capacity function in round R1.
Starting with c′, arbitrarily decrease the capacities of schools to obtain capacity function c′′ so
that for any school hj, c
′(hj)− c(hj) ≥ c
′′(hj)− c(hj) ≥ 0 and the total of c
′′ − c over all schools is
k′. Starting with M, the round R1 matching, run the Gale-Shapley algorithm with students from
L proposing and with current capacities fixed at c′′.
We claim that when this algorithm terminates, the matching found will be student-optimal, stable
and each school hj will be allocated c
′′(hj) students from L. To see the last claim, observe that
the proposals received by any school hj will be weakly better than the c
′(hj)− c(hj) students of
L who were allocated to hj under matching M
′.
5.2 Setting II
The mechanism for round R2 for MinNMaxL in Situation II is given in Figure 2. Suppose there
is a school hj, student sk ∈ SM is assigned to it and there is a student si ∈ N such that hj prefers
si to sk. Now, if si is kept unmatched, (si, hj) will form a blocking pair of type 1 by Lemma 2.
Next suppose hj is under-filled and there is a student si ∈ N such that hj and si prefer each other
to ∅. This time, if si is kept unmatched, (si, hj) will form a blocking pair of type 2 by Lemma 2.
Motivated by this, for a student si, define the set of schools forming blocking pairs with si, denoted
Schools-FBPairs(si), to be:
Schools-FBPairs(si) = {hj ∈ H | hj prefers si to LPS-Assigned(hj), and si prefers hj to ∅}
⋃
{hj ∈ H | hj is under-filled and hj and si prefer each other to ∅}.
Therefore, all students in N′, computed in Step 3, need to be matched. Our mechanism keeps all
students in N − N′ unmatched, thereby minimizing the number of students matched from N.
We next describe the various barriers that need to be defined. The first one, defined in Step 2,
plays the same role as that in Figure 1. As before, if hj is under-filled, Barrier1(hj) = ∅. If a stu-
dent si ∈ (N
′ ∪ L′) appears after Barrier1(hj) in l(hj) and is assigned to hj, then (Barrier1(hj), hj)
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MinNMaxL(M,N, L):
Input: Stable matching M, and sets N and L.
Output: Stable, IC, MinNMaxL extension of M.
1. ∀si ∈ SM : M
′(si)← M(si)
2. ∀hj ∈ H : Barrier1(hj)← BS-Preferring(hj).
3. N′ ← {si ∈ N | Schools-FBPairs(si) is non-empty}.
4. ∀hj ∈ H : Barrier2(hj)← Best student for hj in (N − N
′).
5. ∀hj ∈ H : Barrier(hj)← Best student for hj in {Barrier1(hj), Barrier2(hj)}.
6. L′ ← {si ∈ L | ∃hj s.t. si appears before Barrier(hj) in l(hj),
and hj appears before ∅ in l(si)}.
7. ∀si ∈ (N
′ ∪ L′) : Feasible-Schools(si) ← {hj | si appears before Barrier(hj) in l(hj)}.
8. ∀si ∈ (N
′ ∪ L′) : M′(si) ← Best school for si in Feasible-Schools(si).
9. ∀si ∈ ((L− L
′) ∪ (N − N′)) : M′(si) ← ∅.
10. Return M′.
Figure 2: Mechanism for round R2 for MinNMaxL in Setting II
will form a blocking pair. The second one, Barrier2(hj) in (N − N
′) defined in Step 4. Again,
if si ∈ (N
′ ∪ L′) appears after Barrier2(hj) in l(hj) and is assigned to hj, then (Barrier2(hj), hj)
will form a blocking pair. In step 5, Barrier(Hj) is defined to be the more stringent of these two
barriers.
The final question is which school should si ∈ N
′ be matched to? One possibility is to compute
for each student si the set
T(si) = {hj ∈ H | ∃sk s.t. M(sk) = hj, hj prefers si to sk, and si prefers hj to ∅},
and match si to her best school in T(si).
Assume that si is matched to hj under this scheme. A blocking pair may arise as follows: Assume
si prefers school hk to hj (of course, hk /∈ T(si)), some student sl ∈ L
′ has been assigned to hk and
hk prefers si to sl . If so, (si, hk) will form a blocking pair. One remedy is to redefine the barrier for
hk so sl is not assigned to hk. However, this will make the barrier more stringent and the resulting
mechanism will, in general, match fewer students from L than our mechanism. The latter is as
follows: simply match si to the best school which prefers her to the Barrier of that school.
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Proof. of Theorem 2: The arguments given above already establish stability of matching M′ com-
puted. Next, let us argue that the mechanism is DSIC for students in N and L. The matching
M is not affected by the preference lists of N. Therefore the choice of N′, and hence (N − N′),
is independent of the preference lists of N. Barrier1 is influenced only by preference lists of SM
and Barrier2 by those of (N− N′). Hence Barrier is independent of the preference lists of N′ and
L′. Hence, the matching of students in these two sets is also done in a DSIC manner.
Clearly, each student in N′ must be matched because otherwise she forms a blocking pair w.r.t.
M. Since our mechanism does not match any more students from N, it achieves MinN . As argued
above, not imposing the more stringent of the two barriers computed may result in a blocking
pair. Therefore our mechanism imposes the minimum restrictions needed for stability when it is
attempting to match students from L. Hence it achieves MinNMaxL.
Next, we turn to a slightly different problem within Setting II, namely find the largest subset of
(N ∪ L) that can be matched in a stability-preserving and DSIC manner. We call this problem
MaxN∪L. As shown below, this mechanism also solves the problems MaxNMaxL and MaxLMaxN ,
namely maximizing the number of students matched from L after having maximized the number
of students matched from N and vice versa.
Theorem 7. There is a polynomial time mechanism M2 that is DSIC for students and finds the largest
subset of (N ∪ L) that can be matched to schools and added to the current matching while maintaining
stability. This mechanism also solves MaxNMaxL and MaxLMaxN .
Proof. We will show that the mechanism presented in Figure 1, with (N ∪ L) playing the role of L,
suffices. Barriers for schools are computed as before in Step 2. Denote the subset of (N ∪ L) that
is matched in round R2 by (N ∪ L)′; it consists of students si ∈ (N ∪ L) such that some school hj
prefers si to Barrier(hj) and si prefers hj to ∅. If so, si is assigned to the best such school.
The argument given in Theorem 1 suffices to show stability of the matching produced. Observe
that Barrier, computed in Step 2, is independent of the preference lists of N and L and hence the
mechanism is DSIC for N and L. As before, matching any student from the rest of (N ∪ L) will
lead to a blocking pair, and hence the mechanism maximizes the number of students matched in
round R2.
Finally, since this mechanism acts on N and L independently of each other, it solves MaxNMaxL
and MaxLMaxN as well.
5.3 Setting III
Theorems 4 and 6 leave the possibility of obtaining a pair of non-oblivious, stability-preserving,
ICNE mechanisms for Setting III, and this is what we present next. Additionally, both our
mechanisms run in polynomial time.
The mechanisms M1 and M2 are given in Figures 3 and 4 respectively. M1 first computes the
student-optimal matching for all students in S. Then all students in (S− S1) are removed from the
matching. In general, this will create under-filled schools and hence type 2 blocking pairs. While
there exists a blocking pair of type 2, involving a school hj, say, the student si = BS-Preferring(hj)
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M1(S, S1,H, c):
Input: Sets S of students, H of schools, and S1 ⊆ S of students participating in round R1.
Output: Stable matching M from S1 to H ∪ {∅}.
1. M ← Student-optimal stable matching from S to H ∪ {∅} under school capacities c.
2. Remove all students of (S− S1) from M.
3. While ∃ school hj which participates in a type 2 blocking pair:
(a) Let si = BS-Preferring(hj).
(b) M ← M ∪ {(si, hj)}.
4. Return M.
Figure 3: Mechanism for round R1 in Setting III
is reassigned to hj. This cannot create a type 1 blocking pair, as proven in Lemma 4. However,
it decreases the extent to which hj is under-filled, but increases the extent to which school hk is
under-filled, where hk is the school to which si was previously assigned. We show below that
this process must terminate in a stable matching in polynomial time.
Lemma 3. Step 3 in mechanismM1, given in Figure 3, runs in polynomial time.
Proof. Each time a reassignment is done, the school of the reassigned student improves. There-
fore, at most nm reassignments can be done.
Lemma 4. The matching M returned byM1 is stable.
Proof. Clearly, the matching obtained in Step 1 is stable. Step 2 introduces only blocking pairs of
type 2. Hence, at the beginning of Step 3, where the reassignments are made, only blocking pairs
of type 2 exist. A reassignment for school hj matches hj to si = BS-Preferring(hj). Hence, after
the reassignment, si becomes LPS-Assigned(hj), and the new BS-Preferring(hj) if it exists, must
appear after si in the preference list of hj. By Lemma 2, no blocking pairs of type 1 are created.
Step 3 terminates when there are no more blocking pairs of type 2; by Lemma 3, this takes at
most nm iterations of Step 3. Hence, the matching output by M1 is stable.
The second mechanismM2 is similar to the one given in Figure 2. However, the setting is much
more complex, making it necessary to give new definitions for some of the terms, with two
parameters instead of one. For each student si ∈ SM, the definition of set of schools preferred by si
remains the same as before and is denoted by Preferred-Schools(si). For each school hj ∈ H and
set of students T, define the set of students from T that prefer hj over the school they are assigned to,
denoted Preferring-Students(hj; T) to be {si ∈ T | hj ∈ Preferred-Schools(si)}. Finally, define the
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M2(M, S2,N, L):
Input: Stable matching M and sets S2, N, L.
Output: Stable, IC, MinS2∪NMaxL extension of M.
1. ∀si ∈ SM : M
′(si)← M(si).
2. S′2 ← {si ∈ S2 | Schools-FBPairs(si) is non-empty}.
3. ∀si ∈ S
′
2 : M
′(si)← Best school for si in Schools-FBPairs(si).
4. ∀hj ∈ H : Barrier1(hj)← BS-Preferring(hj; SM).
5. ∀hj ∈ H : Barrier2(hj)← Best student for hj in (N − N
′) ∪ (S2− S′2).
6. ∀hj ∈ H : Barrier3(hj)← BS-Preferring(hj; S2).
7. ∀hj ∈ H : Barrier(hj)← Best student for hj in {Barrier1(hj), Barrier2(hj), Barrier3(hj)}.
8. N′ ← {si ∈ N | Schools-FBPairs(si) is non-empty}.
9. L′ ← {si ∈ L | ∃hj s.t. si appears before Barrier(hj) in l(hj),
and hj appears before ∅ in l(si)}.
10. ∀si ∈ (N
′ ∪ L′) : Feasible-Schools(si) ← {hj | si appears before Barrier(hj) in l(hj)}.
11. ∀si ∈ (N
′ ∪ L′) : M′(si) ← Best school for si in Feasible-Schools(si).
12. ∀si ∈ (N − N
′) ∪ (S2 − S′2) : M
′(si) ← ∅.
13. ∀si ∈ (L− L
′) : M′(si)← ∅.
14. Return M′.
Figure 4: Mechanism for round R2 in Setting III
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best student from T preferring hj, denoted BS-Preferring(hj; T), to be the student from T whom hj
prefers the best in the set Preferring-Students(hj; T). If Preferring-Students(hj; T) = ∅ then we
will define BS-Preferring(hj; T) = ∅; in particular, this happens if hj is under-filled.
The main new difference from the mechanism of round R2 in Setting II is the manner in which a
student si ∈ S
′
2 is assigned to a school. In particular, this is different from the way si ∈ (N
′ ∪ L′) is
assigned to a school. Indeed, if si ∈ S
′
2 were assigned a school in the same way as si ∈ (N
′ ∪ L′),
then she could end up getting a better school by gaming the round she participates in. Hence,
this difference is critical to ensuring that the mechanism is ICNE.
By a similar argument to the one given in Section 5.2, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 5. The matching M′ returned byM2 is stable.
Next we show that the pair of mechanisms (M1,M2) is ICNE, i.e., no student si can gain by not
being truthful, assuming all other students are truthful. Throughout the argument, we consider
two scenarios: the scenario in which si is truthful, denoted by superscript t, and the scenario in
which si cheats, denoted by superscript c. For example, M
t is the matching returned by M1 if si
is truthful, and Mc is the matching returned by M1 if si is cheating. The analysis is divided into
two cases: si ∈ S and si ∈ N.
Case 1: si ∈ S. Then si can cheat by misreporting her preferences, or participating only in
round R2, or both.
Lemma 6. If si participates in round R1, i.e., si ∈ S1, she cannot gain by misreporting her preferences.
Proof. If si participates in R1, no student has cheated on time of participation. Therefore, S1 = S
and hence mechanismM1 simply computes the student-optimal matching on S.
If si ∈ L
t, i.e., si is not matched in the first round even if she report her true preferences, then si
cannot be matched in round R1 regardless of the preferences she reports. This follows from the
incentive-compatibility w.r.t. students, of the student-optimal Gale-Shapley algorithm [DF81]. In
round R2, si is assigned to the best possible school, according to her reported list, subject to
the Barriers. Since no other student cheated, S2 = ∅. Therefore, the Barriers depend only on
preference lists of students in SM and N − N
′, i.e., they are independent of si’s preference list.
Hence, she cannot gain by misreporting.
If si ∈ S
t
M, the school which she is assigned to in M
t will be her final school. Again, by incentive-
compatibility of the Gale-Shapley algorithm, she cannot be matched to a better school by misre-
porting her preferences.
Lemma 7. If si participates in R2 only, i.e., si ∈ S2, she is assigned to the same school that she would be
assigned to had she participated in R1 as well, regardless of the preferences she reports.
Proof. Let M0 be the student-optimal matching, in particular w.r.t. the preference list si report.
Since si does not participate in R1, M
c can be obtained from M0, by this following procedure:
• Let hj = M0(si). Remove si from M0.
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• If there is no student preferring hj than her current school, stop. Otherwise, let si1 be
BS-Preferring(hj) and hj1 = M0(si1). Match si1 to hj.
• If there is no student preferring hj1 than her current school, stop. Otherwise, let si2 be
BS-Preferring(hj1 ) and hj2 = M0(si2). Match si−2 to hj−1.
. . .
The procedure ends when there is no student preferring hjk for some k. By Lemma 3, we know
that the procedure is finite. Construct a directed graph G whose vertices are in H ∪ {∅} and
there is an edge for each reassignment:
E(G) = {v
x
←− u | student x is reassigned from school u to school v in the above procedure.}
Claim 1. G is acyclic.
Proof. Construct G in the order of reassignments done by the procedure. Notice that each re-
assignment sends a student to the school where the previously reassigned student left. Hence,
each new edge that appears will point towards the tail of the previous edge. Let C be the first
cycle that appears, for the sake of contradiction. Suppose
C = u1
x1←− u2
x2←− u3 . . . ut
xp
←− u1.
In particular, the reassignment of x1 happens first and the reassignment of xp happens last among
all reassignments in the cycle. Consider G at the point where C appears. Since C is the first cycle
appearing, each school in C has exactly one incoming edge. In other words, there are no students
reassigned to any schools in C before the reassignment of x1. Therefore, xi = BS-Preferring(ui)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k w.r.t. M0. By Lemma 2, applying the reassignments of C to M0 creates no
blocking pairs. Hence, the resulting matching M1 is stable. Since all students are reassigned to
better schools, M0 is not student-optimal, leading to a contradiction.
Hence, G has a path from some school (possibly ∅) to hj. Now suppose that si is assigned to
school hk byM2. For the sake of contradiction, assume that si prefers hk to hj. Since si is assigned
to school hk byM2, hk ∈ Schools-FBPairs(si). There are two possibilities:
1. hk is under-filled in M
c. Then si would have been assigned to hk if si had come in R1.
2. hk prefers si to LPS-Assigned(hk) at some point in the reassignment process. In this case,
hk must be on the path formed by E(G), since otherwise, (si, hk) is a blocking pair of type
1 w.r.t. M0. Let P be the path from hk to hj = M0(si) in G:
P = hj
si1←− hj1
si2←− . . . hk.
Let M1 be the matching obtained by reassigning si from hj to hk and applying all reassign-
ments in P. Then for each student sa reassigned in this process, sa = BS-Preferring(hb),
where hb is the school to which sa is reassigned, w.r.t. M0. By Lemma 2, no blocking pairs
are created and M1 is stable. Moreover, the reassigned students get better schools in M1
than in M0. This contradicts the student-optimality of M0.
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By Lemmas 6 and 7, a student in S cannot gain by misreporting her preferences, or participating
only in R2, or both. This completes the analysis for the first case.
Case 2: si ∈ N. Now, si can cheat only by misreporting her preference list. Since Schools-FBPairs(si)
is independent of the list she reports, and she is matched to the best school in Schools-FBPairs(si)
w.r.t the list, she cannot gain by misreporting.
Hence we get:
Lemma 8. (M1,M2) is ICNE.
Proof of Theorem 3. By Lemmas 4 and 5, the matchings returned by M1 and M2 are stable, and
by Lemma 8, the pair (M1,M2) is ICNE. Clearly, all students in N
′ and in S′2 have to be matched
to maintain stability. Since M2 does not match any other students from N or S2, it minimizes
the set of students matched from these sets. As in Setting II, one can check that if a student in L
appears after the Barrier in all schools, then matching her will create a blocking pair. Since M2
matches all other students, i.e., those in L′, it maximizes the set of matched students in L, subject
to minimizing those matched from S2 and N. Students in N
′ and L′ are matched to the best
possible school in which they appear before the Barrier. However, matching students in S′2 in a
similar manner will enable such students to get a better school by not participating in round R1.
To ensure ICNE, such a student si ∈ S
′
2 is matched to her best school in Schools-FBPairs(si).
6 Enumeration of Stable Extensions
In this section we show how to enumerate all the possible stable extensions of a given stable
matching with polynomial delay between any two enumerated matchings. Specifically, the al-
gorithm takes as input a stable matching M from S to H satisfying capacity c and a set of new
students N = {s1, s2 . . . sk} that can be added to the schools. Here the preference lists of all
schools and students are also given. The algoirthm enumerates all solutions M′ from S ∪ N to
H ∪ {∅} such that:
• all assignments in M are preserved in M′, and
• M′ is stable with respect to capacity c′ where
c′(j) =
{∣∣M′−1(hj)∣∣ if ∣∣M′−1(hj)∣∣ > c(j),
c(j) otherwise.
(1)
Note that M′−1(hj) is the set of students assigned to hj under M
′. We say that M′ is a stable
extension of M with respect to N.
The complete algorithm StableExtension(M, c,N) is given in Figure 5. At a high level, the
algorithm maintains a stable extension Me of M with respect to a subset N
′ of N. At each step,
a student si is added to N
′ and all possible assignments A of si that are compatible to Me are
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StableExtension(M, c,N):
Input: Stable matching M, capacity c, new students N = {s1, s2 . . . sk}.
Output: Stable extensions of M, with polynomial delay.
M0 ← M
A1 = FeasibleAssignment(M0, c, s1)
For i1 in A1:
M1 ← Starting from M0, match s1 to i1.
A2 = FeasibleAssignment(M1, c, s2).
For i2 in A2:
...
Ak = FeasibleAssignment(Mk−1, c, sk).
For ik in Ak:
Mk ← Starting from Mk−1, match sk to ik.
Enumerate Mk.
Figure 5: Algorithm for enumerating stable extensions of M.
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FeasibleAssignment(Me, c, si):
Input: Stable matching Me, capacity c, student si.
Output: Set Ai of all possible assignments for si. Adding any assignment in Ai to Me
preserves stability.
1. Initilize Ai to the empty set.
2. For each h in l(si), in decreasing order of preferences, do:
(a) If h = ∅ then Return Ai ∪ {∅}.
(b) Else h = hj:
i. If
∣∣M−1e (hj)∣∣ < c(j) then Return Ai ∪ {hj}.
ii. If si appears before LPS-Assigned(hj) then Return Ai ∪ {hj}.
iii. If si appears after LPS-Assigned(hj) and before BS-Preferring(hj) then
Ai ← Ai ∪ {hj}.
Figure 6: Algorithm for finding feasible matches of si w.r.t. current matching Mc.
identified. In other words, adding each assignment in A to Me gives a stable extension of M with
respect to N′ ∪ {si}. The algorithm branches to an assignment in A and continues to the next
student. When N′ = N, the current matching is returned. The algorithm then backtracks to a
previous branching point and continues.
Figure 6 gives the subroutine for finding compatible assignments. It takes on input the current
matching Me, capacity c, student si and finds all possible assignments Ai of si to H ∪ {∅} such
that stability is preserved. Initially, Ai is set to be an empty set. The subroutine then goes through
the preference list of si one by one in decreasing order. The considered school h is added to Ai
and the subroutine terminates if at least one of the following happens:
• h is ∅,
• h is under-filled,
• h prefers si to LPS-Assigned(h) with respect to Me.
Notice that in the last two scenarios above, if si was assigned to any school after h in her prefer-
ence list, (si, h) would form a blocking pair. Assume none of the above scenarios happens. The
subroutine adds h to A and continues if h prefers si to BS-Preferring(h). Otherwise, h prefers
BS-Preferring(h) to si. Hence, assigning si to h would create a blocking pair. The subroutine
continues to the next school in this case. The following lemma says that FeasibleAssignment
correctly finds all possible assignments of a student, given the current matching, at each step.
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Lemma 9. Let N′ be the set of students assigned (possibly to ∅) in Me, i.e., Me is a stable extension of
M with respect to N′. FeasibleAssignment(Me, c, si) finds all possible assignments of si to H ∪ {∅}
such that adding each assignment to Me gives a stable extension of M with respect to N
′ ∪ {si}.
Proof. By the above argument, FeasibleAssignment considered all possible assignments. It suf-
fices to prove that adding each to Me gives a stable extension.
FeasibleAssignment only assigns student si to school hj whenever si is before BS-Preferring(hj)
in the preference list of hj. Moreover, whenever si is before LPS-Assigned(hj), no school after hj
in the list of si is considered. By Lemma 2, no blocking pair of type 1 is created.
Similarly, when hj is under-filled, no school after hj in the list of si is considered. Hence, no
blocking pair of type 2 is created according to Lemma 2.
Finally, whenever hj is filled, the capacity c(j) increases by 1 according to (1). Hence, adding the
assignment of si to hj gives a stable matching with respect to the new capacity.
Another important observation is that there is at least one possible assignment returned by Fea-
sibleAssignment(Me , c, si) for any input of the subroutine. To see this, consider two cases:
1. if all schools hj that appear before ∅ in the preference list of si prefer BS-Preferring(hj) to
si, then ∅ is a possible assignment for si,
2. if at least one school hj that appears before ∅ in the preference list of si prefers si to
BS-Preferring(hj), hj is a possible assignment.
Hence, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 10. FeasibleAssignment(Me, c, si) returns at least one possible assignment.
From Lemmas 9 and 10, we can prove the main theorem of this section:
Theorem 8. StableExtension(M, c,N) enumerates all possible stable extension of M with respect to
N. Moreover, the time between any two enumerations is O((k+ n)m).
Proof. Let M′ be a stable extension of M with respect to N. Let i1, i2 . . . ik be the assignment
of s1, s2 . . . sk respectively. For 1 ≤ l ≤ k, denote by Ml the matching obtained by adding
s1i1, s2i2, . . . slil to M. By Lemma 9, il+1 must be in the set of possible assignments returned by
FeasibleAssignment(Ml , c, sl). Hence, StableExtension(M, c,N) correctly enumerates Mk =
M′ at some point.
By Lemma 10, there are at most k calls of FeasibleAssignment between two matchings enu-
merated by StableExtension. Each call of FeasibleAssignment goes through a student prefer-
ence list of at most m+ 1 schools (including ∅). The time needed for initializing and updating
LPS-Assigned(hj) and BS-Preferring(hj) for each school hj at each step is O((k + n)m). Hence
the total time is O((k+ n)m).
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7 Discussion
Designing a mechanism that actually gets used in practice involves consideration of numerous
low-level details, which is not the focus of this paper. Indeed, this paper should be viewed as
a work in algorithm design, motivated by natural questions from school choice, and adhering
fairly closely to the ground rules of that discipline.
An advantage of such an approach is that the algorithms designed often turn out to have ex-
tremely useful properties which were not explicitly sought. Perhaps the most impressive exam-
ple of this is the Gale-Shapley stable matching algorithm [?]. Many years after its discovery, it
was shown to be incentive compatible for the gender that proposes [DF81]. In a similar vein, for
Settings I and II, we sought simple, polynomial-time stability-preserving algorithms. After hav-
ing discovered the algorithms, we realized that they were in fact DSIC. This precisely is the power
of the “algorithmic way of thinking,” a key paradigm developed within Theoretical Computer
Science.
Numerous variants of the problems studied in this paper seem natural and worth addressing:
• Allowing reassignments of students matched in round R1 leads to several new problems,
e.g., in round R2, maximizing the number of students admitted from L by reassigning the
minimum number of students matched in round R1.
• Adding an entire new school.
• Altering Setting II to require maxN minL or maxLminN .
Are these polynomial time solvable or are they NP-hard?
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